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Abstract—Preventing implicit information flows by
dynamic program analysis requires coarse approxima-
tions that result in false positives, because a dynamic
monitor sees only the executed trace of the pro-
gram. One widely deployed method is the no-sensitive-
upgrade check, which terminates a program whenever
a variable’s taint is upgraded (made more sensitive)
due to a control dependence on tainted data. Although
sound, this method is restrictive, e.g., it terminates the
program even if the upgraded variable is never used
subsequently. To counter this, Austin and Flanagan in-
troduced the permissive-upgrade check, which allows a
variable upgrade due to control dependence, but marks
the variable “partially-leaked”. The program is stopped
later if it tries to use the partially-leaked variable.
Permissive-upgrade handles the dead-variable assign-
ment problem and remains sound. However, Austin
and Flanagan develop permissive-upgrade only for a
two-point (low-high) security lattice and indicate a
generalization to pointwise products of such lattices. In
this paper, we develop a non-trivial and non-obvious
generalization of permissive-upgrade to arbitrary lat-
tices. The key difficulty lies in finding a suitable notion
of partial leaks that is both sound and permissive and in
developing a suitable definition of memory equivalence
that allows an inductive proof of soundness.
I. Introduction
Information flow control (IFC) is often used to enforce
confidentiality and integrity of data. In a language-based
setting, IFC may be enforced statically [9], [21], [15],
[17], [11], [8], dynamically [3], [4], [13], [2], [20], [10], or
in hybrid ways [5], [18], [12], [16]. We are particularly
interested in dynamic IFC and, more specifically, dynamic
IFC for JavaScript, which has features like runtime code
construction and runtime modification of scope chains that
make static analysis difficult.
Dynamic IFC usually works by tracking taints or labels
on individual program values in the language runtime. A
label represents a mandatory access policy on the value.
For example, the label L (low confidentiality) convention-
ally means that data may be read by an (unspecified
but fixed) adversary and H (high confidentiality) means
the opposite. More generally, labels may be drawn from
This is an updated version of a paper of the same title published
at the ACM Ninth Workshop on Programming Languages and Anal-
ysis for Security (PLAS), 2014 (doi>10.1145/2637113.2637116). The
update improves the permissiveness of the dynamic analysis of the
original paper slightly.
any lattice of policies, with higher labels representing
more restrictive policies. A value v labeled A is written
vA. IFC analysis propagates labels as data flows during
program execution. Flows are of two kinds. Explicit flows
are induced by expression evaluation and variable assign-
ment. For example, if either variable y or z is labeled H
(confidential), then the result of computing y+z will have
label H , which makes it confidential as well.1
Implicit flows are induced by control flow dependencies.
For example, in the program of Listing 1, the value in
variable x at the end of line 3 depends on the value in z
(so the value in x at the end of line 3 must be labeled H
if the value in z is confidential), but x is never assigned
any expression that explicitly depends on z. To track
such implicit flows, dynamic IFC maintains an additional
taint, usually called the program counter taint or program
context taint or pc, which is an upper bound on the control
dependencies that lead to the current instruction being
executed. In our example, if z is labeled H , then at line 3,
pc = H because of the branch in line 2 that depends on z.
By tracking pc, dynamic IFC can enforce that x has label
H at the end of line 3, thus taking into account the control
dependency.
However, simply tracking control flow dependencies via
pc is not enough to guarantee absence of information flows
when labels are flow-sensitive, i.e., when the same variable
may hold values with different labels depending on what
program paths are executed. The program in Listing 1
is a classic counterexample, taken from [3]. Assume that
z is labeled H and x and y are labeled L initially. We
compute the final value in y as a function of the value
in z. If z contains trueH , then y ends with trueL: The
branch on line 2 is not taken, so x remains falseL at
line 4. Hence, the branch on line 4 is taken, but pc = L
at line 5 and y ends with trueL. If z contains falseH ,
then similar reasoning shows that y ends with falseL.
Consequently, in both cases y ends with label L and its
value is exactly equal to the value in z. Hence, an adversary
can deduce the value of z by observing y at the end (which
is allowed because y ends with label L). So, this program
leaks information about z despite correct use of pc.
Handling such flows in dynamic IFC requires coarse
1By “z is labeled H” we actually mean “the value in z is labeled
H”. This convention is used consistently.
1 x = false, y = false
2 if (not(z))
3 x = true
4 if (not(x))
5 y = true
Listing 1. Implicit flow from z to y
1 x = false
2 if (not(z))
3 x = true
4 if (y) f() else g()
5 x = false
Listing 2. Impermissiveness of the NSU strategy
approximation because a dynamic monitor only sees pro-
gram branches that are executed and does not know
what assignments may happen in alternate branches
in other executions. One such coarse approximation
is the no-sensitive-upgrade (NSU) check proposed by
Zdancewic [22]. In the program in Listing 1, we upgrade
x’s label from L to H at line 3 in one of the two executions
above, but not the other. Subsequently, information leaks
in the other execution (where x’s label remains L) via
the branch on line 4. The NSU check stops the leak
by preventing the assignment on line 3. More generally,
it stops a program whenever a variable’s label is up-
graded due to a high pc. This check suffices to provide
termination-insensitive noninterference, a standard secu-
rity property [21]. However, terminating a program pre-
emptively in this manner is quite restrictive in practice.
For example, consider the program of Listing 2, where z
is labeled H and y is labeled L. This program potentially
upgrades variable x at line 3 under a high pc, and then
executes function f when y is true and executes function
g otherwise. Suppose that f does not read x. Then, for
y 7→ trueL, this program leaks no information, but the
NSU check would terminate this program prematurely at
line 3. (Note: g may read x, so x is not a dead variable at
line 3.)
To allow a dynamic IFC to accept such safe executions
of programs with variable upgrades due to high pc, Austin
and Flanagan proposed a less restrictive strategy called
permissive-upgrade [4]. Whereas NSU stops a program
when a variable’s label is upgraded due to assignment
in a high pc, permissive-upgrade allows the assignment,
but labels the variable partially-leaked or P . The taint
P roughly means that the variable’s content in this
execution is H , but it may be L in other executions.
The program must be stopped later if it tries to use or
case-analyze the variable (in particular, branching on a
partially-leaked Boolean variable is stopped). Permissive-
upgrade also ensures termination-insensitive noninterfer-
ence, but is strictly more permissive than NSU. For
example, permissive-upgrade stops the leaky program of
e := n | x | e1 ⊙ e2
c := x := e | c1; c2 |
if e then c1 else c2 |
while e do c1
A := L | H
pc := A
k, l,m := A
Fig. 1. Syntax
Listing 1 at line 4 when z contains falseH , but it allows
the program of Listing 2 to execute to completion when y
contains trueL.
a) Contribution of this paper: Although permissive-
upgrade is useful, its development in literature is incom-
plete so far: Austin and Flanagan’s original paper [4], and
work building on it, develops permissive-upgrade for only
a two-point security lattice, containing levels L and H
with L ⊏ H , and the new label P . A generalization to a
pointwise product of such two-point lattices (and, hence, a
powerset lattice) was suggested by Austin and Flanagan in
the original paper, but not fully developed. As we explain
in Section III, this generalization works and can be proved
sound. However, that still leaves open the question of
generalizing permissive-upgrade to arbitrary lattices. It is
not even clear hitherto that this generalization exists.
In Section IV, we show by construction that a gener-
alization of permissive-upgrade to arbitrary lattices does
indeed exist and that it is, in fact, non-obvious. Specifi-
cally, the rule for adding partially-leaked labels and the
definition of store (memory) equivalence needed to prove
noninterference are reasonably involved. On powerset lat-
tices, the resulting IFC monitor is different from the result
of the product construction, and we show that our system
can be more permissive than the product construction in
some cases. By developing this generalization, our work
makes permissive-upgrade applicable to arbitrary security
lattices like other IFC techniques and, hence, constitutes
a useful contribution to IFC literature.
II. Language and Basic IFC Semantics
Our technical development is based on a simple im-
perative language shown in Figure 1.2 The language’s
expressions include constants or values (n), variables (x)
and unspecified operators (⊙) to combine them. The set
of variables is fixed upfront. Labels (A) are drawn from
a fixed security lattice. For now, the lattice contains only
2Austin and Flanagan’s work on permissive-upgrade is based on a
λ-calculus with dynamic allocation, which is more general than this
language [4]. However, our key ideas are orthogonal to the choice of
language and generalize to the language of [4] easily. We use a simpler
language to simplify non-essential technical details.
Expressions:
const:
〈n, σ〉 ⇓ n⊥
var:
nk := σ(x)
〈x, σ〉 ⇓ nk
oper:
e = e′ ⊙ e′′ 〈e′, σ〉 ⇓ n′k
′
〈e′′, σ〉 ⇓ n′′k
′′
n := n′ ⊙ n′′ k := k′ ⊔ k′′
〈e, σ〉 ⇓ nk
Statements:
seq:
〈c1, σ〉 ⇓pc σ
′′ 〈c2, σ
′′〉 ⇓pc σ
′
〈c1; c2, σ〉 ⇓pc σ
′
if-else-t:
〈e, σ〉 ⇓ nA n = true 〈c1, σ〉 ⇓pc⊔A σ
′
〈if e then c1 else c2, σ〉 ⇓pc σ
′
if-else-f:
〈e, σ〉 ⇓ nA n = false 〈c2, σ〉 ⇓pc⊔A σ
′
〈if e then c1 else c2, σ〉 ⇓pc σ
′
while-f:
〈e, σ〉 ⇓pc n
A n = false
〈while e do c1, σ〉 ⇓pc σ
while-t:
〈e, σ〉 ⇓ nA n = true 〈c1, σ〉 ⇓pc⊔A σ
′′ 〈while e do c1, σ
′′〉 ⇓pc⊔A σ
′
〈while e do c1, σ〉 ⇓pc σ
′
Fig. 2. Semantics
two labels {L,H} with the ordering L ⊏ H ; we generalize
this later in the paper. Join (⊔) and meet (⊓) operations
are defined as usual on the lattice. The program counter
label pc is an element of the lattice.
A. IFC Semantics and NSU
The rules in Figure 2 define the big-step semantics of the
language, including standard taint propagation for IFC:
the evaluation relation 〈e, σ〉 ⇓ nk for expressions, and the
evaluation relation 〈c, σ〉 ⇓pc σ
′ for commands. Here, σ
denotes a store, a map from variables to labeled values of
the form nk. For now, labels k ::= A; we generalize this
later when we introduce partially-leaked taints.
The evaluation relation for expressions evaluates an
expression e and returns its value n and label k. The
label k is the join of labels of all variables occurring in
e (according to σ). The relation for commands executes a
command c in the context of a store σ, and the current
program counter label pc, and yields a new store σ′. The
function Γ(σ(x)) returns the label associated with the
value in x in store σ: If σ(x) = nk, then Γ(σ(x)) = k. We
write ⊥ for the least element of the lattice. Here, ⊥ = L.
We explain the rules for evaluating commands. The rule
for sequencing c1; c2 evaluates the command c1 under store
σ and the current pc label; this yields a new store σ′′. It
then evaluates the command c2 under store σ
′′ and the
same pc label, which yields the final store σ′.
The rules for if-else evaluate the branch condition e
to a value n with label A. Based on the value of n, one of
the branches c1 and c2 is executed under a pc obtained by
joining the current pc and the label A of n. Similarly, the
rules for while evaluate the loop condition e and execute
the loop command c1 while e evaluates to true. The pc
assn-NSU:
l := Γ(σ(x)) pc ⊑ l 〈e, σ〉 ⇓ nm
〈x := e, σ〉 ⇓pc σ[x 7→ n
(pc⊔m)]
Fig. 3. Assignment rule for NSU
for the loop is obtained by joining the current pc and the
label A of the result of evaluating e.
Rules for assignment statements are conspicuously miss-
ing from Figure 2 because they depend on the strategy
used to control implicit flows. In the remainder of this
paper we consider a number of such rules. To start, the rule
for assignment corresponding to the NSU check is shown
in Figure 3. The rule checks that the label l of the assigned
variable x in the initial store σ is at least as high as pc
(premise pc ⊑ l). If this condition is not true, the program
gets stuck. This is exactly the NSU check described in
Section I.
B. Termination-Insensitive Noninterference
The end-to-end security property usually established
for dynamic IFC is termination-insensitive noninterfer-
ence (TINI). Noninterference means (in a technical sense,
formalized below) that two runs of the same program
starting from any two stores that are observationally
equivalent for any adversary end with two stores that are
also observationally equivalent for that adversary. For our
observation model, where the adversary sees only initial
and final memories, termination-insensitive means that we
are willing to tolerate the one-bit leak when an adversary
checks whether or not the program terminated (for pro-
grams with intermediate observable outputs, termination-
insensitivity may leak more than one bit [1]). In particular,
this discounted one-bit leak accounts for termination due
to failure of the NSU or permissive-upgrade check. Tech-
nically, termination-insensitivity amounts to considering
only properly terminating runs in the noninterference
theorem.
Store equivalence is formalized as a relation∼A, indexed
by lattice elements A, representing the adversary.
Definition 1. Two labeled values nk1 and n
m
2 are A-
equivalent, written nk1 ∼A n
m
2 , iff either:
1) (k = m) ⊑ A and n1 = n2 or
2) k 6⊑ A and m 6⊑ A
This definition states that for an adversary at security
level A, two labeled values nk1 and n
m
2 are equivalent iff
either A can access both values and n1 and n2 are equal,
or it cannot access either value (k 6⊑ A and m 6⊑ A). The
additional constraint k = m in clause (1) is needed to
prove noninterference by induction. Note that two values
labeled L and H respectively are distinguishable for the
L-adversary.
Definition 2. Two stores σ1 and σ2 are A-equivalent,
written σ1 ∼A σ2, iff for every variable x, σ1(x) ∼A σ2(x).
The following theorem states TINI for the NSU check.
The theorem has been proved for various languages in the
past; we present it here for completeness.
Theorem 1 (TINI for NSU). With the assignment rule
from Figure 3, if σ1 ∼A σ2 and 〈c, σ1〉 ⇓pc σ
′
1 and
〈c, σ2〉 ⇓pc σ
′
2, then σ
′
1 ∼A σ
′
2.
Proof: Standard, see e.g., [3]
Although we have restricted our security lattice to two
elements L and H , the rules of Figures 2 and 3, the
definition of equivalence above and the theorem above (for
NSU) are all general and work for arbitrary lattices.
III. Permissive-Upgrade on a Two-Point Lattice
As described in Section I, the NSU check is restrictive
and halts many programs that do not leak information. To
improve permissiveness, the permissive-upgrade strategy
was proposed as a replacement for NSU by Austin and
Flanagan [4]. However, that development is limited to a
two-point lattice L ⊏ H and to pointwise products of
such lattices. We present the key results of [4] here (using
modified notation and for our language) and then build a
generalization of permissive-upgrade to arbitrary lattices
in the next section. Readers should keep in mind that in
this section, the lattice has only two levels: L (public) and
H (confidential).
We introduce a new label P for “partially-leaked”. We
allow labels k, l,m on values to be either elements of the
lattice (L,H) or P . The pc can only be one of L,H
because branching on partially-leaked values is prohibited.
This is summarized by the revised syntax of labels in
Figure 4. The figure also lifts the join operation ⊔ to labels
including P . Note that joining any label with P results in
P . For brevity in definitions, we also extend the order ⊏
A := L | H
pc := A
k, l,m := A | P
k ⊔ k = k
L ⊔H = H
L ⊔ P = P
H ⊔ P = P
Fig. 4. Syntax of labels including the partially-leaked label P
to L ⊏ H ⊏ P . However, P is not a new “top” member
of the lattice because it receives special treatment in the
semantic rules.
The intuition behind the partial-leak label P is the
following:
A variable with a value labeled P may have been
implicitly influenced by H-labeled values in this exe-
cution, but in other executions (obtainable by chang-
ing H-labeled values in the initial store), this implicit
influence may not exist and, hence, the variable may
be labeled L.
The rule for assignment with permissive-upgrade is
assn-PUS:
l := Γ(σ(x)) 〈e, σ〉 ⇓ nm
〈x := e, σ〉 ⇓pc σ[x 7→ n
k]
where k is defined as follows:
k =


m if pc = L
m ⊔H if pc = H and l = H
P otherwise
The first two conditions in the definition of k correspond
to the NSU rule (Figure 3). The third condition applies,
in particular, when we assign to a variable whose initial
label is L with pc = H . The NSU check would stop
this assignment. With permissive-upgrade, however, we
can give the updated variable the label P , consistent with
the intuitive meaning of P . This allows more permissive-
ness by allowing the assignment to proceed in all cases.
To compensate, we disallow any program (in particular,
an adversarial program) from case analyzing any value
labeled P . Consequently, in the rules for if-then and
while (Figure 2), we require that the label of the branch
condition be of form A, which does not include P .
The noninterference result obtained for NSU earlier
can be extended to permissive-upgrade by changing the
definition of store equivalence. Because no program can
case-analyze a P -labeled value, such a value is equivalent
to any other labeled value.
Definition 3. Two labeled values nk1 and n
m
2 are equiva-
lent, written nk1 ∼ n
m
2 , iff either:
1) (k = m) = L and n1 = n2 or
2) k = m = H or
3) k = P or m = P
Theorem 2 (TINI for permissive-upgrade with a two–
point lattice). With the assignment rule assn-PUS, if
σ1 ∼ σ2 and 〈c, σ1〉 ⇓pc σ
′
1 and 〈c, σ2〉 ⇓pc σ
′
2, then σ
′
1 ∼ σ
′
2.
Proof: See [4].
Note that the above definition and proof are specific to
the two-point lattice.
b) Generalization from [4]: Austin and Flanagan
point out that permissive-upgrade on a two-point lattice,
as described above, can be generalized to a pointwise
product of such lattices. Specifically, let X be an index
set — these indices are called principals in [4]. Let a label
l be a map of type X → {L,H, P} and let the subclass
of pure labels contain maps A, pc of type X → {L,H}.
The order ⊏ and the join operation ⊔ can be generalized
pointwise to these labels. Finally, the rule assn-PUS can
be generalized pointwise by replacing it with the following
rule:
assn-PUS’:
l := Γ(σ(x)) 〈e, σ〉 ⇓ nm
〈x := e, σ〉 ⇓pc σ[x 7→ n
k]
where k is defined as follows:
k(a) =


m(a) if pc(a) = L
m(a) ⊔H if pc(a) = H and l(a) = H
P otherwise
It can be shown that for any semantic derivation in
this generalized system, projecting all labels to a given
principal yields a valid semantic derivation in the system
with a two-point lattice. This immediately implies nonin-
terference for the generalized system, where observations
are limited to individual principals.
Definition 4. Two labeled values nk1 and n
m
2 are a-
equivalent, written nk1 ≈
a nm2 , iff either:
1) k(a) = m(a) = L and n1 = n2 or
2) k(a) = m(a) = H or
3) k(a) = P or m(a) = P
Theorem 3 (TINI for permissive-upgrade with a product
lattice). With the assignment rule assn-PUS’, if σ1 ≈
a σ2
and 〈c, σ1〉 ⇓pc σ
′
1 and 〈c, σ2〉 ⇓pc σ
′
2, then σ
′
1 ≈
a σ′2.
Proof: Outlined above.
c) Remark: This generalization also makes sense if
the principals are pre-ordered by a relation, say, ≤, with
a ≤ b meaning that “if a has access, then b must have
access”. It can be proved that the following is an invariant
on all labels l that arise during program execution: ((a ≤
b) ∧ (l(a) = L))⇒ l(b) = L. Hence, the intuitive meaning
of the order ≤ is preserved during execution.
This generalization of the two-point lattice to an ar-
bitrary product of such lattices is interesting because an
1 if (x′)
2 z = y1
3 else
4 z = y2
5 if (x1)
6 z = x1
7 if (not(x2))
8 z = x2
9 if (z)
10 w = z
Listing 3. Example explaining rule assn-2
arbitrary powerset lattice can be simulated using such a
product. However, this still leaves open the question of
constructing a generalization of permissive-upgrade to an
arbitrary lattice. We develop such a generalization in the
next section.
IV. Permissive-Upgrade on Arbitrary Lattices
The generalization of permissive-upgrade described in
this section applies to an arbitrary security lattice. For
every element A of the lattice, we introduce a new label
A⋆ which means “partially-leaked A”, with the following
intuition.
A variable labeled A⋆ may contain partially-leaked
data, where A is a lower-bound on the ⋆-free labels
the variable may have in alternate executions.
The syntax of labels is listed in Figure 6. Labels k, l,m
may be lattice elements A or ⋆-ed lattice elements A⋆. In
examples, we use suggestive lattice element names L,M,H
(low, medium, high). Labels of the form A are called ⋆-
free or pure. Figure 6 also defines the join operation ⊔ on
labels, which is used to combine labels of the arguments of
⊙. This definition is based on the intuition above. When
the two operands of ⊙ are labeled A1 and A2
⋆, A1⊔A2 is
a lower bound on the pure label of the resulting value in
any execution (because A2 is a lower bound on the pure
label of A2
⋆ in any run). Hence, A1 ⊔ A2
⋆ = (A1 ⊔ A2)
⋆.
The reason for the definition A1
⋆ ⊔ A2
⋆ = (A1 ⊔ A2)
⋆ is
similar.
Our rules for assignment are shown in Figure 5. They
strictly generalize the rule assn-PUS for the two-point
lattice, treating P = L⋆. Rule assn-1 applies when the
existing label of the variable being assigned to is Ax or
Ax
⋆ and pc ⊑ Ax. The key intuition behind the rule is
the following: If pc ⊑ Ax, then it is safe to overwrite the
variable, because Ax is necessarily a lower bound on the
(pure) label of x in this and any alternate execution (see
the framebox above). Hence, overwriting the variable
cannot cause an implicit flow. As expected, the label of
the overwritten variable is pc ⊔m, where m is the label of
assn-1:
l := Γ(σ(x)) 〈e, σ〉 ⇓ nm l = Ax ∨ l = Ax
⋆ pc ⊑ Ax k := pc ⊔m
〈x := e, σ〉 ⇓pc σ[x 7→ n
k]
assn-2:
l := Γ(σ(x)) 〈e, σ〉 ⇓ nm l = Ax ∨ l = Ax
⋆ pc 6⊑ Ax k := ((pc ⊔m) ⊓ Ax)
⋆
〈x := e, σ〉 ⇓pc σ[x 7→ n
k]
Fig. 5. Assignment rules for the generalized permissive-upgrade3
w = falseL1 , x1 = trueL1 , y1 = falseM1 , y2 = trueM2
x′ = trueL
′
x′ = falseL
′
x2 = trueL2 x2 = falseL2
assn-2 with k := Ax⋆ assn-2 with k := ((pc ⊔m) ⊓ Ax)⋆
if (x′) if-branch taken, pc = L′
z = y1 z = falseM1
else else-branch taken, pc = L′ else-branch taken, pc = L′
z = y2 z = trueM2 z = trueM2
if (x1) branch taken, pc = L1 branch taken, pc = L1 branch taken, pc = L1
z = x1 z = trueL1 z = trueM2
⋆
z = trueL
⋆
if (not(x2)) branch not taken branch taken, pc = L2 branch taken, pc = L2
z = x2 z = falseL2 z = falseL
⋆
if (z) branch taken, pc = L1 branch not taken execution halted
w = z w = trueL1
Result w = trueL1 w = falseL1 (leak) execution halted (no leak)
TABLE I
Execution steps in two runs of the program from Listing 3, with two variants of the rule assn-2
A := L | M | . . . | H
pc := A
k, l,m := A | A⋆
A1 ⊔ A2
⋆ := (A1 ⊔A2)
⋆
A1
⋆ ⊔ A2
⋆ := (A1 ⊔A2)
⋆
Fig. 6. Labels and label operations
H
M1 M2
L′L1 L2
L
Fig. 7. Lattice explaining rule assn-2
the value assigned to x.
Rule assn-2 applies in the remaining case — when
pc 6⊑ Ax. In this case, there may be an implicit flow, so
the final label on x must have the form A⋆ for some A.
The question is which A? Intuitively, it may seem that one
could choose A = Ax, the pure part of the original label
3In the original paper, k := (pc ⊓Ax)⋆ in the rule for assn-2
of x. The final label on x would be Ax
⋆ and this would
satisfy the intuitive meaning of ⋆ written in the framebox
above. Indeed, this intuition suffices for the two-point
lattice of Section III. However, for a more general lattice,
this intuition is unsound, as we illustrate with an example
below. The correct label is ((pc ⊔m) ⊓ Ax)
⋆. (Note that
this correct label is independent of the labelm of the value
assigned to x. This is sound because x is ⋆-ed and cannot
be case-analyzed later, so the label on the value in it is
irrelevant.)
d) Example: We illustrate why we need the label
k := ((pc ⊔ m) ⊓ Ax)
⋆ instead of k := Ax
⋆ in rule assn-
2. Consider the lattice of Figure 7 and the program of
Listing 3. Assume that, initially, the variables z, w, x1, x
′,
x2, y1 and y2 have labels H , L1, L1, L
′, L2, M1 and M2,
respectively. Fix the attacker at level L1. Fix the value of
x1 at true
L1 , so that the branch on line 5 is always taken
and line 6 is always executed. Set y1 7→ false
M1 , y2 7→
trueM2 , w 7→ falseL1 initially. The initial value of z is
irrelevant. Consider two executions of the program starting
from two stores σ1 with x
′ 7→ trueL
′
, x2 7→ true
L2 and
σ2 with x
′ 7→ falseL
′
, x2 7→ false
L2 . Note that because
L′ and L2 are incomparable to L1 in the lattice, σ1 and
σ2 are equivalent for L1.
We show that requiring k := Ax
⋆ in rule assn-2 causes
an implicit flow that is observable for L1. The intermediate
values and labels of the variables for executions starting
from σ1 and σ2 are shown in the second and third columns
of Table I. Starting with σ1, line 2 is executed, but line 4 is
not, so z ends with falseM1 at line 5 (rule assn-1 applies
at line 2). At line 6, z contains trueL1 (again by rule assn-
1) and line 8 is not executed. Thus, the branch on line 9 is
taken and w ends with trueL1 at line 10. Starting with σ2,
line 2 is not executed, but line 4 is, so z becomes trueM2
at line 5 (rule assn-1 applies at line 4). At line 6, rule assn-
2 applies, but because we assume that k := Ax
⋆ in that
rule, z now contains the value trueM2
⋆
. As the branch
on line 7 is taken, at line 8, z becomes falseL2 by rule
assn-1 because L2 ⊑M2. Thus, the branch on line 9 is not
taken and w ends with falseL1 in this execution. Hence,
w ends with trueL1 and falseL1 in the two executions,
respectively. The attacker at level L1 can distinguish these
two results; hence, the program leaks the value of x′ and
x2 to L1.
With the correct assn-2 rule in place, this leak is avoided
(last column of Table I). In that case, after the assignment
on line 6 in the second execution, z has label ((L1 ⊔L1)⊓
M2)
⋆ = L⋆. Subsequently, after line 8, z gets the label
L⋆. As case analysis on a ⋆-ed value is not allowed, the
execution is halted on line 9. This guarantees termination-
insensitive noninterference with respect to the attacker at
level L1.
A. Store equivalence
To prove noninterference for our generalized permissive-
upgrade, we define equivalence of labeled values relative to
an adversary at arbitrary lattice level A. The definition is
shown below. We explain later how it is obtained, but we
note that clauses (3)–(5) here refine clause (3) of Defini-
tion 4 for the two-point lattice. The obvious generalization
of clause (3) of Definition 4 — nk1 ∼A n
m
2 whenever
either k or m is ⋆-ed — is too coarse to allow us to
prove noninterference inductively. For the degenerate case
of the two-point lattice, this definition also degenerates to
Definition 4 (there, A is fixed at L, P = L⋆ and only L
may be ⋆-ed).
Definition 5. Two values nk1 and n
m
2 are A-equivalent,
written nk1 ∼A n
m
2 , iff either
1) k = m = A′ ⊑ A and n1 = n2, or
2) k = A′ 6⊑ A and m = A′′ 6⊑ A, or
3) k = A1
⋆ and m = A2
⋆, or
4) k = A1
⋆ and m = A2 and (A2 6⊑ A or A1 ⊑ A2), or
5) k = A1 and m = A2
⋆ and (A1 6⊑ A or A2 ⊑ A1)
We obtained this definition by constructing (through
examples) an extensive transition graph of pairs of labels
that may be assigned to a single variable at corresponding
program points in two executions of the same program.
Our starting point is label-pairs of the form (A,A). We
discovered that this characterization of equivalence is both
sufficient and necessary. It is sufficient in the sense that
it allows us to prove TINI inductively. It is necessary
in the sense that example programs can be constructed
that end in states exercising every possible clause of
this definition. A technical appendix, available from the
authors’ homepages, lists these examples.
B. Termination-Insensitive Noninterference
Using the above definition of equivalence of labeled
values, we can prove TINI for our generalized permissive-
upgrade. A significant difficulty in proving the theorem
is that our definition of ∼A is not transitive. The same
problem arises for the two-point lattice in [4]. There, the
authors resolve the issue by defining a special relation
called evolution. Here, we follow a more conventional
approach based on the standard confinement lemma. The
need for evolution is averted using several auxiliary lem-
mas that we list below. Detailed proofs of all lemmas and
theorems are presented in our technical appendix.
Lemma 1 (Expression evaluation). If 〈e, σ1〉 ⇓ n
k1
1 and
〈e, σ2〉 ⇓ n
k2
2 and σ1 ∼A σ2, then n
k1
1 ∼A n
k2
2 .
Proof: By induction on e.
Lemma 2 (⋆-preservation). If 〈c, σ〉 ⇓pc σ
′ and Γ(σ(x)) =
A⋆ and pc 6⊑ A, then Γ(σ′(x)) = A′⋆ and A′ ⊑ A.
Proof: By induction on the given derivation.
Corollary 1. If 〈c, σ〉 ⇓pc σ
′ and Γ(σ(x)) = A⋆ and
Γ(σ′(x)) = A′, then pc ⊑ A.
Proof: Immediate from Lemma 2.
Lemma 3 (pc-lemma). If 〈c, σ〉 ⇓pc σ
′ and Γ(σ′(x)) = A,
then σ(x) = σ′(x) or pc ⊑ A.
Proof: By induction on the given derivation.
Corollary 2. If 〈c, σ〉 ⇓pc σ
′ and Γ(σ(x)) = A⋆ and
Γ(σ′(x)) = A′, then pc ⊑ A′.
Proof: Immediate from Lemma 3.
Using these lemmas, we can prove the standard confine-
ment lemma and noninterference.
Lemma 4 (Confinement Lemma). If pc 6⊑ A and
〈c, σ〉 ⇓pc σ
′, then σ ∼A σ
′.
Proof: By induction on the given derivation.
Theorem 4 (TINI for generalized permissive-upgrade).
If σ1 ∼A σ2 and 〈c, σ1〉 ⇓pc σ
′
1 and 〈c, σ2〉 ⇓pc σ
′
2, then
σ′1 ∼A σ
′
2.
Proof: By induction on c.
C. Incomparability to the Generalization of Section III
We have two distinct and sound generalizations of
the original permissive-upgrade for the two-point lattice:
The generalization to pointwise products of two-point
lattices or, equivalently, to powerset lattices as described
in Section III, and the generalization to arbitrary lattices
described earlier in this section. For brevity, we call these
generalizations puP (Section III) and puA (Section IV),
respectively (P and A stand for powerset and arbitrary,
respectively). Since both puP and puA apply to power-
set lattices, an obvious question is whether one is more
permissive than the other on such lattices. We show here
HH
LH HL
LL
Fig. 8. A powerset/product lattice
1 if (y)
2 z = 2
3 x = y + z
4 if (y)
5 x = 3
6 if (x)
7 y = 5
Listing 4. Example where puA is more permissive than puP
that the permissiveness of puP and puA on powerset
lattices is incomparable — there are examples on which
each generalization is more permissive than the other. We
explain one example in each direction below. Roughly,
incomparability exists because puP tracks finer taints (it
tracks partial leaks for each principal separately), but
puA’s rules for overwriting partially-leaked variables are
more permissive.
We use the powerset lattice of Figure 8 for our example.
This lattice is the pointwise lifting of the order L ⊏ H
to the set S = {L,H} × {L,H}. For brevity, we write
this lattice’s elements as LL, LH , etc. When puP is
applied to this lattice, labels are drawn from the set
{L,H, P} × {L,H, P}. We write these labels concisely as
LP ,HL, etc. For puA, labels are drawn from the set S∪S⋆.
We write these labels LH , LH⋆, etc. Note that LH⋆ parses
as (LH)⋆, not L(H⋆) (the latter is not a valid label in puA
applied to this lattice).
e) Example: We start with an example program
which executes completely under puA, but gets stuck un-
der puP (since puA is sound, there is no actual information
leak in the program). This example is shown in Listing 4.
Assume that x, y and z have initial labels LL, HH and
LH , respectively and that y 7→ trueHH , so the branches
on lines 1 and 4 are both taken. The initial values of x and
z are irrelevant but their labels are relevant.
Under puP, z obtains label PH at line 2 by rule assn-
PUS’. At line 3, x obtains the label (HH) ⊔ (PH) = PH .
At line 5, the label of x stays PH by rule assn-PUS’. At
line 6, the program halts because the branch condition x’s
label contains P .
On the other hand, under puA, the program executes
to completion. At line 2, z obtains the label (((HH) ⊔
(LL))⊓(LH))⋆ = LH⋆ by rule assn-2. At line 3, x obtains
the label (HH) ⊔ (LH⋆) = HH⋆. At line 5, the label of
x changes to HH : the pc at this point (equal to the label
of y) is HH , so rule assn-1 applies. Since HH is pure, the
1 if (y)
2 x = z
3 if (z)
4 x = z
5 if (x)
6 z = x
Listing 5. Example where puP is more permissive than puA
program does not stop at line 6.
Hence, on this example, puA is more permissive than
puP.
f) Example: Next, consider the program in Listing 5.
For this program, puP is more permissive than puA.
Assume that x, y and z have initial labels LL, HL
and LH , respectively and that the initial store contains
y 7→ trueHL, z 7→ trueLH , so the branches on lines 1
and 3 are both taken. The initial value in x is irrelevant
but its label is important.
Under puA, x obtains label (((HL)⊔ (LH))⊓ (LL))⋆ =
LL⋆ at line 2 by rule assn-2. At line 4, the same rule applies
but the label of x remains LL⋆. When the program tries
to branch on x at line 5, it is stopped.
In contrast, under puP, this program executes to com-
pletion. At line 2, the label of x changes to PH by rule
assn-PUS’. At line 4, the label changes to LH because pc
and the label of z are both LH . Since this new label has
no P , line 5 executes without halting.
Hence, for this example, puP is more permissive than
puA.
V. Related Work
We directly build on, and generalize, the permissive-
upgrade check of Austin and Flanagan [4]. Earlier sections
describe the connection of that work to ours. In recent
work, we implemented the permissive-upgrade check for
JavaScript’s bytecode in the WebKit browser engine [5].
Our formalization in that work is limited to the two-point
lattice, and generalizing that formalization motivated this
paper. In working with JavaScript bytecode, we found
permissive-upgrade indispensable: The source-to-bytecode
compiler in WebKit generates assignments to dead vari-
ables under high pc, which halts program execution if
the no-sensitive-upgrade check (NSU) is used instead of
permissive-upgrade.
The permissive-upgrade check is just one of many ways
of avoiding implicit flows in dynamic IFC when labels
on variables are flow-sensitive (not fixed upfront). A pre-
cursor to the permissive-upgrade is the NSU check, first
proposed by Zdancewic [22]. A different way of handling
the problem of implicit flows through flow-sensitive labels
is to assign a (fixed) label to each label; this approach
has been examined in recent work by Buiras et al. in
the context of a language with a dedicated monad for
tracking information flows [7]. The precise connection
between that approach and permissive-upgrade remains
unclear, although Buiras et al. sketch a technique related
to permissive-upgrade in their system, while also noting
that generalizing permissive-upgrade to arbitrary lattices
is non-obvious. Our work confirms the latter and shows
how it can be done.
Birgisson et al. [6] describe a testing-based approach
that adds variable upgrade annotations to avoid halting
on the NSU check in an implementation of dynamic IFC
for JavaScript [13]. Hritcu et al. improve permissiveness by
making IFC errors recoverable in the language Breeze [14].
This is accomplished by a combination of two methods:
making all labels public (by upgrading them when neces-
sary in a public pc) and by delaying exceptions.
Finally, IFC with flow-sensitive labels can be enforced
statically or using hybrid techniques that combine static
and dynamic methods [15], [19]. Russo et al. [19] show
formally that the expressive power of sound flow-sensitive
static analysis and sound flow-sensitive dynamic monitors
is incomparable. Hence, there is merit to investigating
hybrid approaches.
VI. Conclusion
Permissive-upgrade is a useful technique for avoiding
implicit flows in dynamic information flow control. How-
ever, the technique’s initial development was limited to a
two-point lattice and pointwise products of such lattices.
We show, by construction, that permissive-upgrade can be
generalized to arbitrary lattices and that the generaliza-
tion’s rules and correctness definitions are non-trivial.
Acknowledgments
We thank anonymous reviewers for their excellent feed-
back on this paper’s presentation. This work was funded
in part by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG)
grant “Information Flow Control for Browser Clients”
under the priority program “Reliably Secure Software
Systems” (RS3), and the German Federal Ministry of Ed-
ucation and Research (BMBF) within the Center for IT-
Security, Privacy and Accountability (CISPA) at Saarland
University.
References
[1] A. Askarov, S. Hunt, A. Sabelfeld, and D. Sands, “Termination-
insensitive noninterference leaks more than just a bit,” in Proc.
European Symposium on Research in Computer Security (ES-
ORICS), 2008, pp. 333–348.
[2] A. Askarov and A. Sabelfeld, “Tight enforcement of
information-release policies for dynamic languages,” in Proc.
IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF),
2009, pp. 43–59.
[3] T. H. Austin and C. Flanagan, “Efficient purely-dynamic in-
formation flow analysis,” in Proc. ACM SIGPLAN Workshop
on Programming Languages and Analysis for Security (PLAS),
2009, pp. 113–124.
[4] ——, “Permissive dynamic information flow analysis,” in Proc.
ACM SIGPLAN Workshop on Programming Languages and
Analysis for Security (PLAS), 2010, pp. 3:1–3:12.
[5] A. Bichhawat, V. Rajani, D. Garg, and C. Hammer, “Informa-
tion flow control in WebKit’s JavaScript Bytecode,” in Proc.
Conference on Principles of Security and Trust (POST), 2014,
pp. 159–178.
[6] A. Birgisson, D. Hedin, and A. Sabelfeld, “Boosting the permis-
siveness of dynamic information-flow tracking by testing,” in
Proc. European Symposium on Research in Computer Security
(ESORICS), 2012, pp. 55–72.
[7] P. Buiras, D. Stefan, A. Russo, and D. Mazieres, “On dynamic
flow-sensitive floating label systems,” in Proc. IEEE Symposium
on Computer Security Foundations (CSF), 2014, to appear.
[8] R. Chugh, J. A. Meister, R. Jhala, and S. Lerner, “Staged
information flow for JavaScript,” in Proc. ACM Conference on
Programming Language Design and Implementation (PLDI),
2009, pp. 50–62.
[9] D. E. Denning and P. J. Denning, “Certification of programs for
secure information flow,” Communications of the ACM, vol. 20,
no. 7, pp. 504–513, Jul. 1977.
[10] D. Devriese and F. Piessens, “Noninterference through secure
multi-execution,” in Proc. IEEE Symposium on Security and
Privacy (Oakland), 2010, pp. 109–124.
[11] S. Guarnieri, M. Pistoia, O. Tripp, J. Dolby, S. Teilhet,
and R. Berg, “Saving the World Wide Web from vulnerable
JavaScript,” in Proc. International Symposium on Software
Testing and Analysis (ISSTA), 2011, pp. 177–187.
[12] G. L. Guernic, A. Banerjee, T. Jensen, and D. A. Schmidt,
“Automata-based confidentiality monitoring,” in Proc. Asian
Computing Science Conference on Secure Software (ASIAN),
2006, pp. 75–89.
[13] D. Hedin and A. Sabelfeld, “Information-flow security for a core
of JavaScript,” in Proc. IEEE Computer Security Foundations
Symposium (CSF), 2012, pp. 3–18.
[14] C. Hritcu, M. Greenberg, B. Karel, B. C. Pierce, and G. Mor-
risett, “All your IFCException are belong to us,” in Proc. IEEE
Symposium on Security and Privacy (Oakland), 2013, pp. 3–17.
[15] S. Hunt and D. Sands, “On flow-sensitive security types,” in
Proc. ACM-SIGPLAN-SIGACT Symposium on Principles of
Programming Languages (POPL), 2006, pp. 79–90.
[16] G. Le Guernic, “Automaton-based confidentiality monitoring
of concurrent programs,” in Proc. IEEE Computer Security
Foundations Symposium (CSF), 2007, pp. 218–232.
[17] A. C. Myers, “JFlow: Practical mostly-static information flow
control,” in Proc. ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT Symposium on
Principles of Programming Languages (POPL), 1999, pp. 228–
241.
[18] F. Nentwich, N. Jovanovic, E. Kirda, C. Kruegel, and G. Vigna,
“Cross-site scripting prevention with dynamic data tainting
and static analysis,” in Proc. Network and Distributed System
Security Symposium (NDSS), 2007.
[19] A. Russo and A. Sabelfeld, “Dynamic vs. static flow-sensitive se-
curity analysis,” in Proc. IEEE Computer Security Foundations
Symposium (CSF), 2010, pp. 186–199.
[20] A. Sabelfeld and A. Russo, “From dynamic to static and back:
Riding the roller coaster of information-flow control research,”
in Proc. Perspectives of Systems Informatics (PSI), 2010, pp.
352–365.
[21] D. Volpano, C. Irvine, and G. Smith, “A sound type system for
secure flow analysis,” Journal of Computer Security, vol. 4, no.
2-3, pp. 167–187, 1996.
[22] S. A. Zdancewic, “Programming languages for information se-
curity,” Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, August 2002.
Appendix
Assumptions:
l is a variable with label L
m is a variable with label M
h is a variable with label H
l⋆ is a variable with label L⋆
L ⊑ M ⊑ H
and we assume the attacker at level L. ℓ represents the
labels that are above the level of the attacker.
The table shows example programs for the transition
from low-equivalent values to low-equivalent values. First
column and first row of the table represents all the possible
ℓ, ℓ ℓ1
⋆, ℓ2 ℓ1, ℓ2
⋆ ℓ1
⋆, ℓ2
⋆ ℓ1, ℓ2 ℓ1
⋆, ℓ2 ℓ1, ℓ2
⋆
ℓ, ℓ - if(h)
x1 = l
if(h)
x1 = l
if(h)
x1 = l
else
x1 = l
x1 = h
x1 = m
if(h)
x1 = 4
if(m)
x1 = l∗
x1 = m
if(h)
x1 = 4
if(m)
x1 = l∗
ℓ1
⋆, ℓ2 x1 = l -
x1 = l
if(h)
x1 = l
if(h)
x1 = l
x1 = h
x1 = m
if (h)
x1 = l
if(m)
x1 = l∗
x1 = m
if (h)
x1 = l
if(m)
x1 = l∗
ℓ1, ℓ2
⋆ x1 = l
x1 = l
if(h)
x1 = l
- if(h)
x1 = l
x1 = h
x1 = m
if (h)
x1 = l
if(m)
x1 = l∗
x1 = m
if (h)
x1 = l
if(m)
x1 = l∗
ℓ1
⋆, ℓ2
⋆ x1 = l
x1 = l
if (h)
x1 = l
x1 = l
if (h)
x1 = l
- x1 = h
x1 = m
if (h)
x1 = l
if (m)
x1 = l∗
x1 = m
if (h)
x1 = l
if (m)
x1 = l∗
ℓ1, ℓ2 x1 = l
x1 = l
if (h)
x1 = l
x1 = l
if (h)
x1 = l
x1 = l
if (h)
x1 = l
else
x1 = l
-
x1 = m
if (h)
x1 = l
if(m)
x1 = l∗
x1 = m
if (h)
x1 = l
if (m)
x1 = l∗
ℓ1
⋆, ℓ2 x1 = l
x1 = l
if (h)
x1 = l
x1 = l
if (h)
x1 = l
x1 = l
if (h)
x1 = l
else
x1 = l
x1 = h -
x1 = m
if (h)
x1 = l
if (m)
x1 = l∗
ℓ1, ℓ2
⋆ x1 = l
x1 = l
if (h)
x1 = l
x1 = l
if (h)
x1 = l
x1 = l
if (h)
x1 = l
else
x1 = l
x1 = h
x1 = m
if (h)
x1 = l
if(m)
x1 = l∗
-
TABLE II
Examples for all possible transitions of low-equivalent to low-equivalent values
ways in which two values can be low-equivalent (from
defintion 5).
A. Proofs and Results
Lemma 1. Expression Evaluation Lemma
If σ1 ∼A σ2,
〈e, σ1〉 ⇓ n
k1
1 ,
〈e, σ2〉 ⇓ n
k2
2 ,
then nk11 ∼A n
k2
2 .
Proof: Proof by induction on the derivation and case
analysis on the last expression rule.
1) const: n1 = n2 = n and k1 = k2 =⊥.
2) var: As σ1 ∼A σ2, ∀x.σ1(x) = n
k1
1 ∼A σ2(x) = n
k2
2 .
3) oper: IH1: If 〈e1, σ1〉 ⇓ n
′k′
1
1 , 〈e1, σ2〉 ⇓ n
′k′
2
2 , σ1 ∼A
σ2, then n
′k′
1
1 ∼A n
′k′
2
2 .
IH2: If 〈e2, σ1〉 ⇓ n
′′k′′
1
1 , 〈e2, σ2〉 ⇓ n
′′k′′
2
2 , σ1 ∼A σ2,
then n
′′k′′
1
1 ∼A n
′′k′′
2
2 .
T.S. nk11 ∼A n
k2
2 , where n1 = n
′
1 ⊙ n
′′
1 , n2 = n
′
2 ⊙ n
′′
2
and k1 = k
′
1 ⊔ k
′′
1 , k2 = k
′
2 ⊔ k
′′
2 .
As σ1 ∼A σ2, from IH1 and IH2, n
′k′
1
1 ∼A n
′k′
2
2 and
n
′′k′′
1
1 ∼A n
′′k′′
2
2 .
Proof by case analysis on low-equivalence definition
for n
′k′
1
1 ∼A n
′k′
2
2 followed by case analysis on low-
equivalence definition for n
′′k′′
1
1 ∼A n
′′k′′
2
2 .
Lemma 2. ⋆-preservation Lemma
∀x.If 〈c, σ〉 ⇓pc σ
′, Γ(σ(x)) = A⋆ and pc 6⊑ A, then
Γ(σ′(x)) = A′⋆ ∧ A′ ⊑ A
Proof: Proof by induction on the derivation and case
analysis on the last rule.
1) skip : σ = σ′.
2) assn-1: As pc 6⊑ A, these cases do not apply.
3) assn-2: From the premises, for x in statement c,
Γ(σ′(x)) = ((pc ⊔m) ⊓ A)⋆ = A′. Thus, A′ ⊑ A.
For any other y, σ(y) = σ′(y). Thus, A′ = A.
4) seq : IH1 : ∀x.If 〈c, σ〉 ⇓pc σ
′′, Γ(σ(x)) = A⋆ and
pc 6⊑ A, then Γ(σ′′(x)) = A′′⋆ ∧ A′′ ⊑ A
IH2 : ∀x.If 〈c, σ′′〉 ⇓pc σ
′, Γ(σ′′(x)) = A′′⋆ and pc 6⊑
A′′, then Γ(σ′(x)) = A′⋆ ∧ A′ ⊑ A′′
Thus, from IH1 and IH2, Γ(σ′(x)) = A′⋆ ∧A′ ⊑ A.
5) if-else: Let k = A′′.
IH: ∀x.If 〈c, σ〉 ⇓pc⊔A′′ σ
′, Γ(σ(x)) = A⋆ and pc ⊔
A′′ 6⊑ A, then Γ(σ′(x)) = A′⋆ ∧ A′ ⊑ A
As pc 6⊑ A, so pc ⊔A′′ 6⊑ A.
Thus from IH, Γ(σ′(x)) = A′⋆ ∧ A′ ⊑ A
6) while-t: Let k = Ae.
IH1: ∀x.If 〈c, σ〉 ⇓pc⊔Ae σ
′′, Γ(σ(x)) = A⋆ and pc ⊔
Ae 6⊑ A, then Γ(σ
′′(x)) = A′′⋆ ∧A′′ ⊑ A
IH2: ∀x.If 〈c, σ′′〉 ⇓pc⊔Ae σ
′, Γ(σ′′(x)) = A′′⋆ and
pc ⊔Ae 6⊑ A, then Γ(σ
′(x)) = A′⋆ ∧ A′ ⊑ A
As pc 6⊑ A, so pc ⊔Ae 6⊑ A.
Thus from IH1 and IH2, Γ(σ′(x)) = A′⋆ ∧A′ ⊑ A
7) while-f : σ = σ′.
Lemma 3. pc Lemma
If 〈c, σ〉 ⇓pc σ
′, then ∀x.Γ(σ′(x)) = A =⇒ (σ(x) =
σ′(x)) ∨ pc ⊑ A.
Proof: Proof by induction on the derivation and case
analyis on the last rule.
• skip: σ(x) = σ′(x).
• assn: For x in the statement c, by premises, A = pc⊔
Ae. Thus, pc ⊑ A.
For any other y s.t. Γ(σ′(y)) = A′, σ(y) = σ′(y).
• seq: IH1: If 〈c, σ〉 ⇓pc σ
′′, then ∀x.Γ(σ′′(x)) = A′′ =⇒
(σ(x) = σ′′(x)) ∨ pc ⊑ A′′.
IH2: If 〈c, σ′′〉 ⇓pc σ
′, then ∀x.Γ(σ′(x)) = A =⇒
(σ′′(x) = σ′(x)) ∨ pc ⊑ A.
From IH2, if σ′′(x) 6= σ′(x), then pc ⊑ A.
If σ′′(x) = σ′(x), then from IH1:
– If σ(x) = σ′′(x): σ(x) = σ′(x).
– If σ(x) 6= σ′′(x): pc ⊑ A′′, where A′′ = Γ(σ′′(x)).
As σ′′(x) = σ′(x), A′′ = Γ(σ′(x)) = A. Thus,
pc ⊑ A.
• if-else: IH: If 〈c, σ〉 ⇓pc⊔Ae σ
′, then ∀x.Γ(σ′(x)) =
A =⇒ (σ(x) = σ′(x)) ∨ pc ⊔ Ae ⊑ A.
From IH, either (σ(x) = σ′(x)) or pc⊔Ae ⊑ A. Thus,
(σ(x) = σ′(x)) ∨ pc ⊑ A.
• while-t: IH1: If 〈c, σ〉 ⇓pc⊔Ae σ
′′, then ∀x.Γ(σ′′(x)) =
A′′ =⇒ (σ(x) = σ′′(x)) ∨ pc ⊑ A′′.
IH2: If 〈c, σ′′〉 ⇓pc⊔Ae σ
′, then ∀x.Γ(σ′(x)) = A =⇒
(σ′′(x) = σ′(x)) ∨ pc ⊑ A.
From similar reasoning as in “seq”, we have either
σ(x) = σ′(x) or pc ⊔ Ae ⊑ A. Thus, σ(x) = σ
′(x) ∨
pc ⊑ A.
• while-f: σ(x) = σ′(x).
Lemma 4. Confinement Lemma If pc 6⊑ A, 〈c, σ〉 ⇓pc σ
′,
then σ ∼A σ
′.
Proof: Proof by induction on the derivation and case
analysis on the last rule.
1) skip : σ = σ′.
2) assn: Let xi = v
ki
i and xf = v
kf
f , s.t ki = Ai ∨ ki =
Ai
⋆.
• pc ⊑ Ai : As pc 6⊑ A, Ai 6⊑ A. By premises of
assn, kf = Af ∨ kf = Af
⋆, where Af = pc ⊔Ae.
As pc 6⊑ A, Af 6⊑ A. Thus, by definition 5.2, 5.3,
5.4 or 5.5, xi ∼A xf .
• pc 6⊑ Ai : By premise, kf = ((pc ⊔ m) ⊓ Ai)
⋆.
Thus, Af ⊑ Ai and by definition 5.3 or 5.5
xi ∼A xf .
3) seq : IH1: σ ∼A σ
′′ and IH2: σ′′ ∼A σ
′. T.S : σ ∼A
σ′.
For all x ∈ dom(σ), respective x′′ ∈ dom(σ′′) and
respective x′ ∈ dom(σ′), x ∼A x
′′ and x′′ ∼A x
′.
To show: x ∼A x
′.
Let x = vk11 , x
′′ = vk22 , x
′ = vk33 , where k1 = A1 ∨
k1 = A1
⋆, k2 = A2 ∨ k2 = A2
⋆ and k3 = A3 ∨ k3 =
A3
⋆.
Case-analysis on definition 5 for IH1.
• (k1 = k2) = A
′ ⊑ A ∧ v1 = v2 : By IH2 and
definition 5, we have
a) (k2 = k3) = A
′ ⊑ A ∧ v2 = v3 (case 1):
Transitivity of equality, (k1 = k3) = A
′ ⊑
A ∧ v1 = v3. Thus, x ∼A x
′.
b) k2 = A
′ and k3 = A3
⋆ ∧ A3 ⊑ A
′ ⊑ A (case
5): By definition 5.5 x ∼A x
′.
• k1 = A1 6⊑ A ∧ k2 = A2 6⊑ A: By IH2, either
a) k2 = A2 6⊑ A ∧ k3 = A3 6⊑ A. By defini-
tion 5.2, x ∼A x
′.
b) k2 = A2 6⊑ A ∧ k3 = A3
⋆: A1 6⊑ A. Thus, by
definition 5.5, x ∼A x
′.
• k1 = A1
⋆ ∧ k2 = A2
⋆: By IH2, we have
a) k2 = A2
⋆ ∧ k3 = A3
⋆ (case 3): By defini-
tion 5.3, x ∼A x
′.
b) k2 = A2
⋆ ∧ k3 = A3 ∧ (A3 6⊑ A) (case 4): By
definition 5.4, x ∼A x
′.
c) k2 = A2
⋆∧k3 = A3∧(A2 ⊑ A3) (case 4): By
corollary 1, pc ⊑ A2. As pc 6⊑ A and A2 ⊑
A3, so A3 6⊑ A. By definition 5.4, x ∼A x
′. .
• k1 = A1
⋆ ∧ k2 = A2 s.t. (A2 6⊑ A) (case 4):
Either
– k2 = A2 6⊑ A ∧ k3 = A3 6⊑ A: By defini-
tion 5.4, x ∼A x
′.
– k2 = A2 6⊑ A ∧ k3 = A3
⋆: By definition 5.3,
x ∼A x
′.
• k1 = A1
⋆ ∧ k2 = A2 s.t. (A1 ⊑ A2) (case 4):
– k2 = k3 = A2: By definition 5.4, x ∼A x
′.
– k2 = A2 6⊑ A ∧ k3 = A3 6⊑ A: By defini-
tion 5.4, x ∼A x
′.
– k2 = A2 6⊑ A ∧ k3 = A3
⋆: By definition 5.3,
x ∼A x
′.
• k1 = A1 ∧ k2 = A2
⋆ s.t. (A1 6⊑ A): By IH2, we
have
a) k2 = A2
⋆ ∧ k3 = A3
⋆ (case 3): By defini-
tion 5.5, x ∼A x
′.
b) k2 = A2
⋆ ∧ k3 = A3 s.t. (A3 6⊑ A) (case 4):
By definition 5.2, x ∼A x
′.
c) k2 = A2
⋆ ∧ k3 = A3 s.t. (A2 ⊑ A3) (case
4): By corollary 1, pc ⊑ A2. As pc 6⊑ A and
A2 ⊑ A3, so A3 6⊑ A. By definition 5.2, x ∼A
x′.
• k1 = A1 ∧k2 = A2
⋆ s.t. (A2 ⊑ A1): Also, (A2 ⊑
A1 ⊑ A). By IH2, we have
a) k2 = A2
⋆ ∧ k3 = A3
⋆ (case 3): As A2 ⊑ A
and pc 6⊑ A, pc 6⊑ A2. By lemma 2, A3 ⊑
A2. Thus, A3 ⊑ A2 ⊑ A1. By definition 5.5,
x ∼A x
′.
b) k2 = A2
⋆ ∧ k3 = A3 (case 4): As A2 ⊑ A
and pc 6⊑ A, pc 6⊑ A2. But, by corollary 1,
pc ⊑ A2. By contradiction, this case does not
hold.
4) if-else : IH : k = A′. If (pc⊔A′) 6⊑ A, then σ ∼A σ
′.
As pc 6⊑ A, pc ⊔A′ 6⊑ A. Thus, by IH, σ ∼A σ
′.
5) while-t: IH1 : k = A′. If (pc⊔A′) 6⊑ A, then σ ∼A σ
′.
As pc 6⊑ A, pc ⊔A′ 6⊑ A. Thus, by IH1, σ ∼A σ
′′.
IH2 : k = A′. If (pc ⊔A′) 6⊑ A, then σ′ ∼A σ
′′.
As pc 6⊑ A, pc ⊔A′ 6⊑ A. Thus, by IH, σ′′ ∼A σ
′.
Therefore, σ ∼A σ
′′ and σ′′ ∼A σ
′.
(Reasoning similar to seq.)
6) while-f : σ = σ′
Theorem 1. Termination-insensitive non-interference
If σ1 ∼A σ2,
〈c, σ1〉 ⇓pc σ
′
1,
〈c, σ2〉 ⇓pc σ
′
2,
then
σ′1 ∼A σ
′
2.
Proof: By induction on the derivation and case anal-
ysis on the last step
1) skip: σ′1 = σ1 ∼A σ2 = σ
′
2
2) assn(x := e): As σ1 ∼A σ2, ∀x.σ1(x) ∼A σ2(x). Let
σ1(x) = v
k1
1 , σ2(x) = v
k2
2 and
σ′1(x) = v
′k′
1
1 , σ
′
2(x) = v
′k′
2
2
s. t. ki = Ai ∨ ki = Ai
⋆ and k′i = A
′
i ∨ ki = A
′
i
⋆ for
i = 1, 2.
Let 〈e1, σ1〉 ⇓ w
ke
1
1 ∧ 〈e2, σ2〉 ⇓ w
ke
2
2
s. t. kei = A
e
i ∨ k
e
i = A
e
i
⋆ for i = 1, 2. For low-
equivalence of e1 and e2, the following cases arise:
a) kei = A
e
i , s.t. (A
e
1 = A
e
2) = A
e ⊑ A ∧ w1 = w2:
i) pc 6⊑ A1∧pc 6⊑ A2: By premise of assn rules,
k′i = ((pc ⊔ A
e) ⊓ Ai)
⋆. By definition 5.3,
σ′1 ∼A σ
′
2.
ii) pc 6⊑ A1 ∧ pc ⊑ A2: k
′
1 = ((pc ⊔ A
e) ⊓ A1)
⋆
and k′2 = pc ⊔ A
e. As A′1 ⊑ A
′
2, by defini-
tion 5.4, σ′1 ∼A σ
′
2.
iii) pc ⊑ A1 ∧ pc 6⊑ A2: k
′
2 = ((pc ⊔ A
e) ⊓ A2)
⋆
and k′1 = pc ⊔ A
e. As A′2 ⊑ A
′
1, by defini-
tion 5.5, σ′1 ∼A σ
′
2.
iv) pc ⊑ A1 ∧ pc ⊑ A2: k
′
1 = pc ⊔ A
e and k′2 =
pc ⊔ Ae. If pc ⊑ A and Ae ⊑ A and w1 =
w2, by definition 5.1, σ
′
1 ∼A σ
′
2. If pc 6⊑ A,
pc ⊔ Ae 6⊑ A. By definition 5.2, σ′1 ∼A σ
′
2.
b) Ae1 6⊑ A∧A
e
2 6⊑ A: From premise of assignment
rules, k′1 = pc ⊔ A
e
1 ∨ k
′
1 = (pc ⊔ A
e
1)
⋆ ∨ k′1 =
((pc⊔Ae1)⊓A1)
⋆. Similarly, k′2 = pc⊔A
e
2∨k
′
2 =
(pc⊔Ae2)
⋆∨k′2 = ((pc⊔A
e
2)⊓A2)
⋆. Since Ae1 6⊑ A
and Ae2 6⊑ A, pc ⊔ A
e
1 6⊑ A and pc ⊔ A
e
1 6⊑ A.
Therefore, from Definition 5.2, 5.3, 5.4 or 5.5
σ′1 ∼A σ
′
2.
c) kei = A
e
i
⋆: By premise of assn rules, k′i = ((pc ⊔
Aei )⊓Ai)
⋆ or k′i = (pc⊔A
e
i )
⋆. By definition 5.3,
σ′1 ∼A σ
′
2.
d) ke1 = A
e
1
⋆ ∧ ke2 = A
e
2:
i) pc 6⊑ A1∧pc 6⊑ A2: By premise of assn rules,
k′i = ((pc ⊔ A
e
i ) ⊓ Ai)
⋆. By definition 5.3,
σ′1 ∼A σ
′
2.
ii) pc 6⊑ A1 ∧ pc ⊑ A2: k
′
1 = ((pc ⊔ A
e
1) ⊓ A1)
⋆
and k′2 = pc ⊔ A
e
2. From definition 5.4,
Ae1 ⊑ A
e
2, so (pc ⊔ A
e
i ) ⊓ A1 ⊑ pc ⊔ A
e
2.
By definition 5.4, σ′1 ∼A σ
′
2.
iii) pc ⊑ A1 ∧ pc 6⊑ A2: k
′
2 = ((pc ⊔ A
e
2) ⊓ A2)
⋆
and k′1 = (pc ⊔ A
e
1)
⋆. By definition 5.3,
σ′1 ∼A σ
′
2.
iv) pc ⊑ A1 ∧ pc ⊑ A2: k
′
1 = (pc ⊔ A
e
1)
⋆ and
k′2 = pc ⊔ A
e
2. If A
e
2 6⊑ A, so pc ⊔ A
e
2 6⊑ A.
Else if Ae1 ⊑ A
e
2, then pc ⊔ A
e
1 ⊑ pc ⊔ A
e
2.
By definition 5.4, σ′1 ∼A σ
′
2.
e) ke1 = A
e
1 ∧ k
e
2 = A
e
2
⋆:
i) pc 6⊑ A1∧pc 6⊑ A2: By premise of assn rules,
k′i = ((pc ⊔ A
e
i ) ⊓ Ai)
⋆. By definition 5.3,
σ′1 ∼A σ
′
2.
ii) pc 6⊑ A1 ∧ pc ⊑ A2: k
′
1 = ((pc ⊔ A
e
1) ⊓ A1)
⋆
and k′2 = (pc ⊔ A
e
2)
⋆. By definition 5.3,
σ′1 ∼A σ
′
2.
iii) pc ⊑ A1 ∧ pc 6⊑ A2: k
′
1 = pc ⊔ A
e
1 and k
′
2 =
((pc ⊔Ae2)⊓A2)
⋆. (pc ⊔Ae2)⊓A2 ⊑ pc⊔A
e
1.
By definition 5.5, σ′1 ∼A σ
′
2.
iv) pc ⊑ A1 ∧ pc ⊑ A2: k
′
1 = (pc ⊔ A
e
1)
⋆ and
k′2 = pc ⊔ A
e
2. If A
e
1 6⊑ A, so pc ⊔ A
e
1 6⊑ A.
Else if Ae2 ⊑ A
e
1, then pc ⊔ A
e
2 ⊑ pc ⊔ A
e
1.
By definition 5.5, σ′1 ∼A σ
′
2.
3) seq: IH1: If σ1 ∼A σ2 then σ
′′
1 ∼A σ
′′
2
IH2: If σ′′1 ∼A σ
′′
2 then σ
′
1 ∼A σ
′
2
Since σ1 ∼A σ2, therefore, from IH1 and IH2 σ
′
1 ∼A
σ′2.
4) if-else: IH: If σ1 ∼A σ2, 〈c, σ1〉 ⇓pc⊔Ae
1
σ′1,
〈c, σ2〉 ⇓pc⊔Ae
2
σ′2 and pc ⊔ A
e
1 = pc ⊔ A
e
2 then
σ′1 ∼A σ
′
2.
• If Ae1 ⊑ A, A
e
1 = A
e
2 and n1 = n2. By IH, σ
′
1 ∼A
σ′2.
• If Ae1 6⊑ A, then A
e
2 6⊑ A, pc ⊔ A
e
i 6⊑ A for
i = 1, 2. By Lemma 4, σ1 ∼A σ
′
1 and σ2 ∼A σ
′
2.
T.S. σ′1 ∼A σ
′
2, i.e., (∀x.σ
′
1(x) ∼A σ
′
2(x))
Case analysis on the definition of low-
equivalence of values, x, in σ1 and σ2. Let
σ1(x) = v
k1
1 and σ2(x) = v
k2
2 and σ
′
1(x) = v
′k′
1
1
and σ′2(x) = v
′k′
2
2
a) (k1 = k2) = A
′ ⊑ A ∧ v1 = v2 = v:
– If k′1 = A
′
1 ∧ k
′
2 = A
′
2, then as σ1 ∼A
σ′1 and σ2 ∼A σ
′
2, by definition 5.1, A
′ =
A′1 ∧ v = v
′
1 and A
′ = A′2 ∧ v = v
′
2. Thus,
A′1 = A
′
2 ∧ v
′
1 = v
′
2, so σ
′
1(x) ∼A σ
′
2(x).
– If k′1 = A
′
1
⋆ ∧ k′2 = A
′
2, then as σ1 ∼A
σ′1 and σ2 ∼A σ
′
2, by definition 5.5 A
′
1 ⊑
A1 = A
′ and by definition 5.1 k′2 = A
′
2 =
A2 = A
′. So, A′1 ⊑ A
′
2. By definition 5.4,
σ′1(x) ∼A σ
′
2(x).
– If k′1 = A
′
1 ∧ k
′
2 = A
′
2
⋆, then as σ1 ∼A
σ′1 and σ2 ∼A σ
′
2,by definition 5.1 k
′
1 =
A′1 = A1 = A
′ and by definition 5.5 A′2 ⊑
A2 = A
′. So, A′2 ⊑ A
′
1. By definition 5.5,
σ′1(x) ∼A σ
′
2(x).
– If k′1 = A
′
1
⋆ ∧ k′2 = A
′
2
⋆, then by
definition 5.3, σ′1(x) ∼A σ
′
2(x).
b) (k1 = A1 6⊑ A) ∧ (k2 = A2 6⊑ A):
– If k′1 = A
′
1 ∧ k
′
2 = A
′
2, then as σ1 ∼A σ
′
1
and σ2 ∼A σ
′
2, by definition 5.2, (k
′
1 =
A′1 6⊑ A) ∧ (k
′
2 = A
′
2 6⊑ A). So, σ
′
1(x) ∼A
σ′2(x).
– If k′1 = A
′
1
⋆ ∧ k′2 = A
′
2, then as σ1 ∼A σ
′
1
and σ2 ∼A σ
′
2, by definition 5.2 k
′
2 = A
′
2 6⊑
A. By definition 5.4, σ′1(x) ∼A σ
′
2(x).
– If k′1 = A
′
1 ∧ k
′
2 = A
′
2
⋆, then as σ1 ∼A σ
′
1
and σ2 ∼A σ
′
2,by definition 5.2 k
′
1 = A
′
1 6⊑
A. By definition 5.5, σ′1(x) ∼A σ
′
2(x).
If k′1 = A
′
1
⋆ ∧ k′2 = A
′
2
⋆, then by
definition 5.3, σ′1(x) ∼A σ
′
2(x).
c) (k1 = A1
⋆ ∧ k2 = A2
⋆) :
– If k′1 = A
′
1
⋆ ∧ k′2 = A
′
2
⋆, by definition 5.3,
σ′1(x) ∼A σ
′
2(x).
– If k′1 = A
′
1 ∧ k
′
2 = A
′
2
⋆, then as σ1 ∼A σ
′
1
and σ2 ∼A σ
′
2,by corollary 2, pc⊔A
e
1 ⊑ A
′
1.
As pc⊔Ae1 6⊑ A and by definition 5.2,A
′
1 6⊑
A. By definition 5.5, σ′1(x) ∼A σ
′
2(x).
– If k′1 = A
′
1
⋆ ∧ k′2 = A
′
2, then as
σ1 ∼A σ
′
1 and σ2 ∼A σ
′
2, by corollary 2,
pc ⊔ Ae2 ⊑ A
′
2. As pc ⊔ A
e
2 6⊑ A and by
definition 5.2, A′2 6⊑ A. By definition 5.4,
σ′1(x) ∼A σ
′
2(x).
– If k′1 = A
′
1 ∧ k
′
2 = A
′
2, then as σ1 ∼A σ
′
1
and σ2 ∼A σ
′
2, by corollary 2, pc⊔A
e
1 ⊑ A
′
1
and pc⊔Ae2 ⊑ A
′
2. As pc⊔A
e
i 6⊑ A and by
definition 5.2, A′1 6⊑ A and A
′
2 6⊑ A. By
definition 5.2, σ′1(x) ∼A σ
′
2(x).
d) (k1 = A1
⋆ ∧ k2 = A2):
– A2 6⊑ A :
∗ If k′1 = A
′
1
⋆ ∧ k′2 = A
′
2
⋆, by defini-
tion 5.3, σ′1(x) ∼A σ
′
2(x).
∗ If k′1 = A
′
1 ∧ k
′
2 = A
′
2
⋆, then as
σ1 ∼A σ
′
1 and σ2 ∼A σ
′
2,by corollary 2,
pc ⊔ Ae1 ⊑ A
′
1. As pc ⊔ A
e
1 6⊑ A and
by definition 5.2, A′1 6⊑ A. By defini-
tion 5.5, σ′1(x) ∼A σ
′
2(x).
∗ If k′1 = A
′
1
⋆ ∧ k′2 = A
′
2, then as
σ1 ∼A σ
′
1 and σ2 ∼A σ
′
2, by defini-
tion 5.2, A′2 6⊑ A. By definition 5.4,
σ′1(x) ∼A σ
′
2(x).
∗ If k′1 = A
′
1 ∧k
′
2 = A
′
2, then as σ1 ∼A σ
′
1
and σ2 ∼A σ
′
2, by corollary 2, pc⊔A
e
1 ⊑
A′1. As pc ⊔ A
e
1 6⊑ A and by defini-
tion 5.2, A′1 6⊑ A. By definition 5.2,
A′2 6⊑ A. By definition 5.2, σ
′
1(x) ∼A
σ′2(x).
– A1 ⊑ A2 ⊑ A :
∗ If k′1 = A
′
1
⋆ ∧ k′2 = A
′
2
⋆, by defini-
tion 5.3, σ′1(x) ∼A σ
′
2(x).
∗ If k′1 = A
′
1 ∧ k
′
2 = A
′
2
⋆, then as
σ1 ∼A σ
′
1 and σ2 ∼A σ
′
2, by corollary 2,
pc ⊔ Ae1 ⊑ A
′
1. As pc ⊔ A
e
1 6⊑ A,
and by definition 5.2, A′1 6⊑ A. By
definition 5.5, σ′1(x) ∼A σ
′
2(x).
∗ If k′1 = A
′
1
⋆ ∧ k′2 = A
′
2, then as σ1 ∼A
σ′1 and σ2 ∼A σ
′
2, A
′
1 ⊑ (pc ⊔ A
e
1) ⊓ A1
as pc ⊔ Ae1 6⊑ A1 and A
′
2 = A2 by
corollary 1 and definition 5.1. Thus,
A′1 ⊑ A
′
2. By definition 5.4, σ
′
1(x) ∼A
σ′2(x).
∗ If k′1 = A
′
1 ∧k
′
2 = A
′
2, then as σ1 ∼A σ
′
1
and σ2 ∼A σ
′
2, by corollary 1, pc⊔A
e
1 ⊑
A1. As pc ⊔ A
e
1 6⊑ A, by contradiction
the case does not hold.
e) (k1 = A1 ∧ k2 = A2
⋆):
– A1 6⊑ A :
∗ If k′1 = A
′
1
⋆ ∧ k′2 = A
′
2
⋆, by defini-
tion 5.3, σ′1(x) ∼A σ
′
2(x).
∗ If k′1 = A
′
1
⋆ ∧ k′2 = A
′
2, then as
σ1 ∼A σ
′
1 and σ2 ∼A σ
′
2,by corollary 2,
pc ⊔ Ae2 ⊑ A
′
2. As pc ⊔ A
e
2 6⊑ A and
by definition 5.2, A′2 6⊑ A. By defini-
tion 5.5, σ′1(x) ∼A σ
′
2(x).
∗ If k′1 = A
′
1 ∧ k
′
2 = A
′
2
⋆, then as
σ1 ∼A σ
′
1 and σ2 ∼A σ
′
2, by defini-
tion 5.2, A′1 6⊑ A. By definition 5.4,
σ′1(x) ∼A σ
′
2(x).
∗ If k′1 = A
′
1 ∧k
′
2 = A
′
2, then as σ1 ∼A σ
′
1
and σ2 ∼A σ
′
2, by corollary 2, pc⊔A
e
2 ⊑
A′2. As pc ⊔ A
e
2 6⊑ A and by defini-
tion 5.2, A′2 6⊑ A. By definition 5.2,
A′1 6⊑ A. By definition 5.2, σ
′
1(x) ∼A
σ′2(x).
– A2 ⊑ A1 :
∗ If k′1 = A
′
1
⋆ ∧ k′2 = A
′
2
⋆, by defini-
tion 5.3, σ′1(x) ∼A σ
′
2(x).
∗ If k′1 = A
′
1 ∧ k
′
2 = A
′
2
⋆, then as σ1 ∼A
σ′1 and σ2 ∼A σ
′
2, A
′
2 ⊑ (pc ⊔ A
e
2) ⊓ A2
as pc ⊔ Ae2 6⊑ A2 and A
′
1 = A1 by
corollary 1 and definition 5.1. Thus,
A′2 ⊑ A
′
1. By definition 5.5, σ
′
1(x) ∼A
σ′2(x).
∗ If k′1 = A
′
1
⋆ ∧ k′2 = A
′
2, then as
σ1 ∼A σ
′
1 and σ2 ∼A σ
′
2, by corollary 2,
pc ⊔ Ae2 ⊑ A
′
2. As pc ⊔ A
e
2 6⊑ A, and
by definition 5.2, A′2 6⊑ A. By defini-
tion 5.4, σ′1(x) ∼A σ
′
2(x).
∗ If k′1 = A
′
1 ∧k
′
2 = A
′
2, then as σ1 ∼A σ
′
1
and σ2 ∼A σ
′
2, by corollary 1, pc⊔A
e
2 ⊑
A2. As pc ⊔ A
e
2 6⊑ A, by contradiction
the case does not hold.
5) while-t: IH1: If σ1 ∼A σ2, 〈c, σ1〉 ⇓pc⊔Ae
1
σ′′1 ,
〈c, σ2〉 ⇓pc⊔Ae
2
σ′′2 and pc ⊔ A
e
1 = pc ⊔ A
e
2 then
σ′′1 ∼A σ
′′
2 .
IH2: If σ′′1 ∼A σ
′′
2 , 〈c, σ
′′
1 〉 ⇓pc⊔Ae1 σ
′
1, 〈c, σ
′′
2 〉 ⇓pc⊔Ae2
σ′2 and pc ⊔ A
e
1 = pc ⊔ A
e
2 then σ
′
1 ∼A σ
′
2.
• If Ae1 ⊑ A, A
e
1 = A
e
2 and n1 = n2. By IH1 and
IH2, σ′1 ∼A σ
′
2.
• IfAe1 6⊑ A, thenA
e
2 6⊑ A, pc⊔A
e
i 6⊑ A for i = 1, 2.
By Lemma 4, σ1 ∼A σ
′′
1 and σ2 ∼A σ
′′
2 .
T.S. σ′′1 ∼A σ
′′
2 : By similar reasoning as if-else.
As σ′′1 ∼A σ
′′
2 , and by Lemma 4, σ
′′
1 ∼A σ
′
1 and
σ′′2 ∼A σ
′
2.
T.S. σ′1 ∼A σ
′
2: By similar reasoning as if-else.
6) while-f: σ′1 = σ1 ∼A σ2 = σ
′
2
